It has been argued that groups of fighters who "belong" to a party to an international armed conflict without fulfilling the requirements of Article 4(A)(2) of Geneva Convention III should be classified as combatants, rather than as civilians. This article questions the reasoning put forward in support of that view, by showing that the arguments may be partly circular, incomplete, and debatable.
Introduction
This article concerns the classification of a specific group of fighters in armed conflicts: fighters who are members of a group that "belongs" to a party to an international armed conflict (IAC) in line with Article 4(A)(2) of Geneva Convention III (GC III), 1 yet do not comply with all the requirements listed in that provision. The mainstream view seems to be that these fighters should be classified as combatants, despite the apparent wording of GC III. This article aims to show that the main arguments advanced to support this view are unsatisfactory, and that the question is more complex than what has been hitherto assumed.
The topic in question is part of a more general debate about civilians taking a direct part in hostilities; a debate covering multiple disputed points. Therein, arguments have arisen over e.g. what it means to "belong" to a party to a conflict; whether members of groups taking a direct part in hostilities should be classified as combatants, civilians, or something else; what it means to take a direct part in hostilities; how long the loss of civilian protection lasts; what it takes to regain civilian protection; whether there is a principle of "least harm" towards civilians taking part in hostilities; and how the classification of individuals may affect the classification of relevant conflicts. 2 The current article concerns a narrow question within this more general debate, which has so far been dealt with only briefly, if at all, by previous contributions.
The question of classification raised in this article is relevant to many real life conflicts, contemporary and historical. In the Vietnam War, the non-State group . Section 6 provides a conclusion.
The Issue
The (international) law of armed conflict distinguishes between two types of conflict:
international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. Most sources agree that there are no further categories of armed conflict. The rules of international law that regulate IACs distinguish between different categories of persons. As such, the primary distinction is that between combatants and civilians, which are to be considered as being mutually exclusive. 17 More precisely they have "combatant immunity", which bars prosecution and punishment of their regular acts of war by foreign States. This is seen e.g. in Chapter III of GIII, particularly in the rule in
Article 82 that prisoners of wars (i.e. enemy combatants) can be subject to judicial punishment only for acts that would also be illegal for the detaining power's own forces. 
Mainstream Arguments
According to the ICRC's Interpretive Guidelines, fighters who belong to a party to an IAC without fulfilling the criteria in Article 4(A)(2) of GC III should be classified as combatants rather than civilians:
Strictly speaking, however, these requirements constitute conditions for the post-capture entitlement of irregular armed forces to combatant privilege and prisoner-of-war status and are not constitutive elements of the armed forces of a party to a conflict.
Thus, while members of irregular armed forces failing to fulfil the four requirements may not be entitled to combatant privilege and prisoner-ofwar status after capture, it does not follow that any such person must necessarily be excluded from the category of armed forces and regarded as a civilian for the purposes of the conduct of hostilities. On the contrary, it would contradict the logic of the principle of distinction to place irregular armed forces under the more protective legal regime afforded to the civilian population merely because they fail to distinguish themselves from that population, to carry their arms openly, or to conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Therefore, even under the terms of the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions, all armed actors showing a sufficient degree of military organization and belonging to a party to the conflict must be regarded as part of the armed forces of that party.
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A similar argument is made by Akande:
[I]t must be remembered that article 4 of GCIII was not drafted for the purpose of the law relating to targeting or the conduct of hostilities. That provision addresses itself to prisoner of war status and issues relating to internment and detention of combatants. There is a distinction between the rules relating to the targeting, rules relating to detention and those relating to prosecution. A person may be classified differently depending on the purposes for which classification is being made. A member of an organized armed group that belongs to a State who falls outside the scope of application of GCIII will fall within the scope of the Fourth Convention (which is titled as the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War-GCIV). However, the protections accorded such a person under that latter Convention deal mainly with fundamental rules of humane treatment as well as rules relating to internment. Coming within the scope of the Fourth Convention does not necessarily mean that a person is not to be regarded as a combatant for the purposes of the conduct of hostilities. One would suspect that State practice bears this out and that States do not consider themselves to be more restricted when it comes to targeting irregular groups that belong to a State but which do not comply with article 4(A)(2) of GCIII. Indeed, it would be a very odd situation, if members of irregular groups that do not comply with the rules of international law concerning distinction, or with the laws and customs of more generally, thereby gain additional protections from targeting because they are now regarded as civilians for the purpose of the law relating to the conduct of hostilities.
22
The reasoning seems to be that the fighters in question are violating their obligations under international humanitarian law when taking part in hostilities, and should not be "rewarded" with civilian status therefore.
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This builds on two premises: (1) that the 21 ICRC, supra note 2, at 22 (footnotes omitted). 
Counterarguments

A. Circularity
The first premise of the arguments cited in section 3 above, seems to be that the fighters in question violate their obligations under international humanitarian law by not complying with the requirements in Article 4(A)(2) of GC III.
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These requirements are that such fighters must be "commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates", have a "fixed distinctive sign", carry "arms openly", and comply with the "laws and customs of war" (see section 2).
Violating the first requirement is hardly compatible with constituting a "group" that can "belong" to a party to an IAC. This is therefore not relevant to the present discussion.
With regard to the following two requirements, combatants in IACs have an obligation to distinguish themselves from the civilian population (Article 44 (3) of AP I). This can be done by, e.g., wearing distinctive emblems and carrying arms openly.
However, there is no such obligation for civilians, even those taking a direct part in hostilities.
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Saying that the fighters in question violate an obligation to distinguish 25 Akande, supra note 22, at 184 speaks of "irregular groups that do not comply with the rules of international law concerning distinction, or with the laws and customs of more generally". ICRC, supra classification. The lack of a responsible commander, a failure to carry arms openly, and not wearing distinctive signs are not similarly relevant.
B. Civilian status as a "reward"
The other premise in the argument is that being classified as a civilian is to "gain additional protections from targeting" 32 and/or to be under "the more protective legal regime afforded to the civilian population" 33 (see section 3).
The fighters in question are part of "militias" or "volunteer corps" that "belong" to a party to an IAC (Article 4(A)(2) of GC III). As such, if the fighters are classified as civilians, they will be members of groups that take a direct part in hostilities. the classification of members of such groups as combatants or civilians has no bearing on their civilian protection. It will be absent in either case.
Whether participation in hostilities leads to a loss of protection is less clear under Geneva Convention IV (GC IV) 38 , which does not have a similar explicit provision in comparison to AP I and AP II. 39 This means that groups that take a direct part in IACs have little or no "additional protection" to be gained from being classified as civilians rather than as combatants. 
A Possible Solution: "Armed Forces"
Akande also argues that:
In any case, the category of persons being discussed (irregulars who are part of groups that belong to a State but who do not meet the conditions in article 4(A)(2) of GCIII) would be part of the armed forces of a State under article 43 of AP I and therefore would not be civilians under article 50(1). Article 43 defines the armed forces of a party as consisting "of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct or its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party."It is recognized that this definition applies not only to regular forces but also to irregular forces which belong to a State. It is correct that Article 43(1) seems to cover more than the formal members of a State party's official military forces, as it also includes "groups and units" that are "under a command responsible" to the party. In short, it is possible to solve the issue raised in the previous sections on the basis of Article 43 of AP I. However, this does not align neatly with the requirement of a "command responsible" read in light of general international law of responsibility.
Thus it is possible that some "belonging" groups may be outside the scope Article 43, which means that their classification cannot be resolved on the basis of that provision.
Conclusion
The classification of members of "militias" or "volunteer corps" that "belong" to a party to an IAC but do not meet the requirements in Article 4(A)(2) of GC III is debatable. It may well be that they should be classified as combatants rather than It is possible to resolve the issue by adopting a broad interpretation of "command responsible" in Article 43 of AP I, but more decisive arguments are needed before it can be seen as fully settled.
